Small talk: Truth and Realism.

The discussion of truth begins with the questioning of its existence.

The proposition does not suggest that truth results from questioning our relationship with the world but that we seem to have a default relationship with the world. We have a unique ability to decipher the difference between ourselves and the world. The differences we understand constitute the features by which we define the qualities that make us what we are and a thing what it is. Almost unintentionaly, we notice what those qualities amount to and for what purpose those things may have come together (taking into account the laws of nature). If this is difficult to follow, it may be the need for a philosophical explanation where in its place, we reference the simple experience of a child who learns the characteristics and use of things around the house. The essence of a key is to open the toy chest. It is not always this easy but it is this simple. It is from this concept that we are better able to explain the concept of truth. What seems obvious is the fact that we are, by default, in some relationship with things other than ourselves. The word default seems the proper term to use because we can only try to describe this relationship or argue that it is insufficient in satisfying our desire to understand the world that is just there. We are left with the simplest possible definition for truth; namely, that truth is that which is. The discussion of the language involved in understanding truth is complicated because of the many faces of the concept of being. From here we determine that truth is not relative. For if truth is what is, it follows from the simple proposition that something cannot both be and not be simultaneous. Truth is not relative.

We can know what is because we can understand the differences between things. Difference is a significant part of the truth because it allows us to look for truth by pointing out what is not or is no longer the case. Differences, as a necessary component of truth, allow us to judge which differences produce for us the circumstances we judge to be good. If this is the case, could it not be said that truth makes judgment possible? At most, we can say that our ability to discern differences allows us to decipher the truth and make judgments. Whatever the case, only after we have a conception of truth can we make judgments. Truth is a necessary component not only of judgment but also of progress. There is no progress without truth. Progress involves knowing the distinction between what is now the case and what could be the case should anything change.

In an essay on truth, Juan Luis Cabrera argues that without truth, we could not have discussions in any meaningful way. We usually dialogue with others with the intent to inform (about facts), persuade someone of a position (based on some truth), or at least share our opinion (we believe we have based on some truth). Meaningful dialogue is how we come to learn about others and ourselves, and this dialogue is how we collaborate and create communities. The importance of language cannot be understated, but the truth is not a product of language. Quite the contrary, language develops and evolves based on our status as truth-seekers. The leap from dialogue to communities outlines the very moral behavior ingrained in human nature. However, we could only discover and evaluate this nature based on what is. A meaningful theory of ethics is perhaps the more important product of realism.

Acknowledging truth in this way makes one sympathetic to Plato's realism. For Plato, truth, or at least the Forms that expressed truth, were not mind-dependent. The same goes for Christians, who should believe that truth is not dependant on our minds in any way. Is not this at least implied by Christ when he declared: he is "the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). When the truth is resides outside of ourselves, then we likewise understand St. Augustine who said,

"you will never be able to say that [truth] belongs particularly to you or to me or any man, for it is available and offers itself to be shared by all who discern things immutably true."

Trying to teach that "truth is what is" has proven quite tricky. Not only because students immediately think this is equivalent to saying that truth is what it is. However, there is no redundancy in our view of truth. The only question is how we accurately understand what is. What is most surprising is the willingness of students to accept a relativist conception of truth in their moral views.

The difficulty lies in the distinction between holding one's own view and the willingness or unwillingness to condemn the actions of others based on that moral outlook. Relativism is not a big deal when people understand it to mean one holds their moral views. However, relativism is hardly that inconsequential. Most of us hold unique moral views (perhaps Hegel's subjective morality is helpful here). However, what makes a person a relativist is whether they can extend their view as morally binding on others. Because only a moral judgment binding beyond one person's subjective disposition has truth value in the way that I have been discussing truth here. In essence, if murder is wrong for you, and you are a relativist, you cannot say that I have done an immoral thing when killing someone if I — or my culture — do not deem murder to be wrong.

The additional problem is that people are hardly compelled to leave their relativist views on morality when these things are explained.  If truth is real, and mind-independent, then no amount of intellectual dishonesty, lack of a capacity for rational and consistent thinking, or fraudulent teaching will change the circumstances from truth is real to truth is relative. The only thing left for educators to do is to find ways to better point out the problems caused by relativism. The dissolution of social trust, social values, and a shared sense of right and wrong are at stake. Because if truth is what is, then the most sacred task for the educator is to teach others to discern those things which are immutably true. Holding on to truth, including moral truth, is not an act of intolerance. Quite the contrary, truth is humbling in a way relativism cannot be. Relativism preaches a hubris that is unwilling to examine itself, for it has broken the mirror of self-reflection. A relativist has nothing concrete against which to measure the goodness of your actions. A wise man once said that the unexamined life is not worth living. What examination is possible when the truth is whatever one wishes it to be?